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DNA FINGERPRINTING: THE VIRGINIA APPROACH
When DNA fingerprinting1 technology first became available in
the context of criminal investigations and prosecutions, scientists,
attorneys and law enforcement officials widely hailed the process
as an mfallible and critically important tool in the search for judi-
cial accuracy 2 Courts rushed to admit DNA evidence while defense
attorneys cowered, feeling ill-equipped to confront this compli-
cated and novel scientific evidence which seemed to link irrefuta-
bly the defendant with the crime scene.3 Additionally, reputable
scientists were not available to testify for the defense, leaving de-
fendants in a truly precarious position.4 An overwhelming percent-
age of the defendants in early DNA fingerprinting cases pleaded
guilty, feeling helpless to defend themselves in the face of scientific
alleged proof of criminal activity 5
Virginia courts were among the first to admit DNA fingerprint-
ing evidence.6 Quickly following this judicial acceptance, state leg-
islation declared that DNA typing was "a reliable scientific tech-
1. The process is most often termed DNA fingerprinting, although it has also been called
DNA typing, among other names. Dr. Alec Jeffreys, a pioneer m the area, coined the phrase
"DNA fingerprinting." Sally E. Renskers, Note, Trial by Certainty: Implications of Genetic
"DNA Fingerprints," 39 EMORY L.J. 309, 309 n.3 (1990).
2. DNA "fingerprints" were once termed "the greatest single breakthrough in the fight
against crime since fingerprints themselves were discovered m 1901." Id. at 309 (citing DNA
Testing on the Increase, 131 SoLic. J. 1596 (1987)).
3. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved Verdicts, 13
CARDozo L. REv. 343 (1991). "Often the plaintiff or the prosecution alone calls an expert
who testifies with little or no cross-examination. The opponent more or less accepts the
expert's evidence as being true if it does not concern a major issue in contention." Id., at
348-49 n.15 (quoting Michael Graham, Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Pro-
cedure, in 101 F.R.D. 599, 634 (1983)).
4. In many early DNA cases, the defense presented no expert witnesses to counter the
claims of the prosecution's DNA proponents. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 849
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In other cases, no expert testimony was offered in favor of the
DNA test. See, e.g., State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 259 (W Va. 1989).
5. According to Lifecodes, a major commercial laboratory involved in DNA fingerprinting
technology, most of the 150 defendants tested between January 1987 and January 1988
pleaded guilty. Renskers, supra note 1, at 310 n.11.
6. See, e.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 850 (Va. 1989) (admitting DNA prints
into evidence), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
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nique" and that evidence of such testing could be admitted to
prove or disprove one's identification.'
In the years following the initial euphoria, DNA fingerprinting
has been subjected to exacting scientific and judicial scrutiny Re-
cently, some courts have declared DNA fingerprinting evidence
inadmissible for a variety of reasons, including inadequate labora-
tory techniques and standards,' and questionable statistical analy-
sis of fingerprinting results." This judicial retreat is largely the re-
sult of various scientific and legal studies which call into question
the very processes that once were deemed infallible. 10
This Note first addresses the science of DNA and the process of
DNA fingerprinting, which is important in understanding the enor-
mous potential that accurate analysis holds for the criminal justice
system. Next, the Note discusses the initial, widespread acceptance
of DNA fingerprinting evidence, and proceeds with an analysis of
the recent trend of questioning this heretofore "omniscient"
process.
The Note then begins a critique of Virginia's approach to the
DNA fingerprinting dilemma, focusing first on the question of
whether the Virginia courts and legislature acted prematurely in
admitting this novel scientific evidence before there was "true"
universal scientific acceptance of the technology The Note con-
cludes with a discussion of the legislatively mandated Virginia
DNA data bank, which is widely viewed as the solution to many of
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (Michie 1990) ("In any criminal proceeding, DNA (deox-
yribonucleic acid) testing shall be deemed to be a reliable scientific technique and the evi-
dence of a DNA profile comparison may be admitted to prove or disprove the identity of
any person.").
8. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that the
laboratory procedures in the case were so inadequate that a declared match was
inadmissible).
9. See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989) (noting " 'the real
danger that the jury will use the [statistical] evidence as a measure of the probability of the
defendant's guilt or innocence' ") (citation omitted); see also State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513,
519 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 443-44 (Ga. 1990); Common-
wealth v. Curmin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 442 (Mass. 1991).
10. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA As Criminal Identifica-
tion Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 303 (1991) (discussing the problem of population sub-
structures and their effect on the representativeness of data bases used in the statistical
analysis of a DNA fingerprint); see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992) [hereinafter RESEARCH COUNCIL] (publishing the results of a major
study on all aspects of DNA analysis).
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the problems raised by traditional DNA fingerprinting. The Vir-
ginia data bank will be stocked with the DNA profiles, obtained
through compulsory blood samples, of every felon in the custody of
the Commonwealth. 1 While the data bank is promising, it raises
some troubling privacy concerns, which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently addressed in Jones v. Mur-
ray 12 The Note analyzes this case with an emphasis on the court's
Fourth Amendment conclusions.
The Note concludes that, although Virginia may have acted
rashly in its wholesale acceptance of DNA technology, DNA finger-
printing does hold a great deal of promise for accurate criminal
prosecutions. The DNA data bank is the best available means of
ensuring that the technology is not misused, yet remains available
while alleviating some concerns surrounding DNA fingerprinting.
THE SCIENCE OF DNA' s
The cells of the human body contain forty-six chromosomes,
twenty-three inherited from the mother and twenty-three inher-
ited from the father.' 4 These chromosomes are composed of deox-
yribonucleic acid (DNA), which is "the basic hereditary material
[which] determines specific traits in organisms by guiding the
production of specific polypeptide chains which interact to form a
protein molecule."' 5 Basically, DNA contains the genetic informa-
tion that determines each person's individual characteristics.' 6
DNA is a chemical structure containing four bases, or nucleo-
tides, which are commonly referred to by their initial letters: A
(adenine), G (guanine), C (cytosine), and T (thymine).17 The man-
ner in which these bases appear throughout the DNA determines
11. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-310.2 to 310.7 (Michie 1990).
12. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
13. DNA tests were developed for use in the field of molecular biology. Laurel Beeler &
William R. Wiebe, DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903, 907
(1988).
14. Id. at 909 n.26.
15. JEFFREY J.W. BAKER & GARLAND E. ALLEN, A COURSE IN BIOLOGY 441-42 (2d ed. 1972).
16. Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 13, at 909 ("The differences we see in each other are the
outward manifestations of each person's unique DNA pattern. Everything from eye, hair,
and skin color to facial features and shoe sizes is determined by DNA.").
17. John C. Dougherty, Comment, Beyond People v. Castro: A New Standard of Admissi-
bility for DNA Fingerprinting, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 269, 277 (1991).
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each individual's physical characteristics.' 8 Each base, or nucleo-
tide, bonds only with its complement base; that is, A bonds only
with T, and C bonds only with G.' 9 The structure of DNA is often
described as a "double helix," or a "ladder twisted along its verti-
cal axis."20 Utilizing the "ladder" analogy, the rungs of the "lad-
der" are comprised of the bonds between the bases.2 1 The order in
which the bonds between the bases appear on the DNA "ladder"
determines the individual characteristics of every person.22 In
other words, each individual's unique genetic code is determined
by the way in which the base pairs sequence along the DNA lad-
der.23 The sequence order of the base pairs does not vary from cell
to cell and is unique to each individual, except in the case of iden-
tical twins.24
Ninety-nine percent of the DNA ladder is the same in each per-
son and is termed nonpolymorphic.2 5 Polymorphic sites, on the
other hand, vary significantly between different people.26 These
polymorphic sites, or loci, are the regions where the variations in
the sequencing of the bases occur and, as noted above, are respon-
sible for each person's unique characteristics. It is these
polymorphic sites, or loci, that allow individuals to be recognized
through DNA fingerprinting.28 Scientists are able to examine the
polymorphic sites and can distinguish between the DNA of differ-
ent people.29
18. Id.
19. Id. at 278.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 278, 278 n.46 ("A nonpolymorphic site may consist of the DNA sequence for
eyes, hands, the head, or other characteristics shared by all Homo sapiens.") (citation
omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 278. "[T]he genes responsible for producing the proteins and antigens in blood
are polymorphic, hence, the existence of different blood types." Id. at 278 n.47 (citation
omitted). Genes are the "portion of DNA that determines hereditary traits." Id. at 278.
Genes situated at the various polymorphic loci account for the differences in human beings.
Id.
28. Id. at 278.
29. Id.
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THE PROCESS OF DNA FINGERPRINTING
The fingerprinting process begins with a sample from which
DNA is to be drawn. The sample must contain cells with nuclei,
because the nuclei contain the DNA.30 The source can be almost
any body tissue or fluid, except for red blood cells, and in criminal
cases common sources include blood, saliva, semen, and hair.3 1 The
tissue or fluid need not be fresh because DNA generally does not
deteriorate rapidly 32
Two prominent fingerprinting procedures exist.33 The first, Re-
striction Fragment Length Polymorphism Analysis (RFLPA), is
used by two commercial laboratories, Cellmark Diagnostics and
Lifecodes Corporation, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.34
The other procedure, a product of Cetus Corporation called Ampli-
typing or Polymerase Chain Reaction, is conducted primarily by
the third major DNA fingerprinting laboratory, Forensic Science
Associates. 3 1
THE EARLY USE OF DNA FINGERPRINTING EVIDENCE
When DNA fingerprinting evidence first reached American
courts in the late 1980's, the courts welcomed it with open arms.36
One judge went so far as to label the new technique "the single
30. Renskers, supra note 1, at 311.
31. Id. at 311-12. "In a rape case, you are likely to recover blood, semen, or hair virtually
100 percent of the time." RONALD KESSLER, THE FBI 255 (1993) (quoting John W Hicks,
the assistant director over the FBI laboratory division).
32. Renskers, supra note 1, at 312. DNA, however, can deteriorate under certain condi-
tions. See Debra C. Moss, DNA-The New Fingerprints, A.BA J., May 1, 1988, at 66, 67.
33. DNA fingerprinting analysis attempts to locate and isolate the polymorphic sites of an
individual's DNA ladder. Dougherty, supra note 17, at 279. Once the polymorphic sites are
located and isolated in both the sample taken from the crune scene and the sample taken
from the suspect, the two are compared to determine if they are identical and therefore
indicative of a match. Id. at 281. This rather technical process has been examined widely
and meticulously. For an excellent discussion of the various procedures, see RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 36-73.
34. See Dougherty, supra note 17, at 277.
35. Id. at 282-83.
36. The first criminal case m which the prosecution successfully employed DNA evidence
was the trial of Florida rapist Tommie Lee Andrews. Kirk Johnson, DNA "Fingerprinting,"
Test Becomes a Factor in Courts, N.Y. Tmss, Feb. 7, 1988, at Al. The conviction was up-
held in State v. Andrews, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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greatest advance in the 'search for truth' since the advent of
cross-examination." 37
The Frye Test
Enthusiasm for DNA fingerprinting led courts to admit DNA ev-
idence under both the test established in Frye v. United States35
and the Federal Rules of Evidence "helpfulness" standard,39 the
dominant admissibility tests for scientific information from expert
witnesses.40
Most states claimed to utilize the Frye test when analyzing new
scientific evidence, but the extent to which this remains true is un-
certain.4 The Frye court reasoned that
[s]omewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field m which it belongs.42
The rationale behind this standard was that, given jurists' limited
understanding of science, the decision concerning the admissibility
of novel scientific evidence should rest with scientists.43 The over-
whelming majority of trial courts considering DNA evidence under
the Frye standard, especially in the earliest cases, determined that
the evidence was admissible."
37. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Albany County Ct. 1988).
38. 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
39. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
40. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 132.
41. See id. ("A majority of states profess adherence to the Frye rule, although a growing
number have adopted variations on the helpfulness standard suggested by the Federal Rules
of Evidence.").
42. Frye, 293 F at 1014 (emphasis added).
43. E.g., RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 133 (arguing that the court's role should be
limited to deciding whether the theory is generally accepted and if the specific techniques
were reliable).
44. See, e.g., id. at 134-45 (noting that of the hundreds of DNA cases heard under the
Frye standard by 1991, an "overwhelming majority" of the courts admitted the evidence);
cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993) (allowing admis-
sion of scientific evidence only when a court determines the evidence is "scientific knowl-
772 [Vol. 35:767
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Helpfulness Standard
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 contains the following language:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.45
When viewed in light of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which dic-
tates that otherwise relevant evidence "may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed" by, among other things,
unfair prejudice,46 Rule 702 clearly is concerned with helping the
trier of fact. In fact, one court has decided that the trial court's
inquiry should concern, among other things, "the possibility that
admitting the evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the
jury ))47
Early DNA Fingerprinting Admissibility Rulings
Andrews v. State48 marked the first United States case in which
DNA fingerprinting evidence was employed successfully In that
case, the Florida District Court of Appeals ruled under the Florida
rules of evidence that DNA evidence was obviously helpful to the
jury.49 Essentially, the court made a Frye determination in ruling
that the process and techniques utilized in the production of DNA
fingerprints had been accepted, for a variety of nonforensic uses, in
the relevant scientific community for several years.50 This ruling
allowed the admission of the testimony of the prosecution's three
expert witnesses, two of whom worked for one of the major com-
mercial DNA fingerprinting laboratories.51 The court deemed the
inability of the defense to muster a single expert and the lack of
edge that will assist the trier of fact"). It remains to be seen what effect Daubert will
have on the admissibility of DNA tests.
45. FED. R. EviD. 702.
46. FED. R EviD. 403.
47. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
48. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
49. Id. at 849.
50. Id.
51. The laboratory was Lifecodes. Id. at 847.
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scientific literature disputing the test's reliability an indication
that DNA Fingerprinting technology was generally accepted in the
scientific community 52 The court viewed the lack of defense repu-
diation of the DNA laboratory's testing procedures and statistical
analysis as further proof of the indisputable quality of the
technology 53
A survey of other cases admitting DNA fingerprinting at its ini-
tial introduction displays similar judicial reasoning. In the first
Virginia case admitting such evidence, Spencer v. Common-
wealth,54 the court ruled that DNA evidence was properly admit-
ted because "[t]he record is replete with uncontradicted expert tes-
timony that no 'dissent whatsoever [exists] in the scientific
community' ,,55 Similarly, in State v. Woodall,56 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals took judicial notice of general scientific
acceptance where expert testimony by the prosecution was
uncontroverted.57
The absence of literature disputing the value of DNA evidence,
however, did not mean necessarily that it was a generally accepted
scientific technology It could mean that no one had the opportu-
nity to dispute such a novel scientific approach at such an early
stage. The court in Andrews discounted this problem by ruling
that it was not a novel approach because it had been used in other
areas for years.5 Of course, the differences between forensic and
nonforensic applications went unnoticed because of the lack of de-
fense witnesses.59
52. Id. at 849.
53. Id. at 850.
54. 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
55. Id. at 797 (alteration in original).
56. 385 S.E.2d 253 (W Va. 1989).
57. Id. at 260.
58. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849-50.
59. See, e.g., RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 52-53. In outlining the differences be-
tween the forensic use of DNA evidence and its primary use as a medical diagnostic tool, the
study wrote:
DNA diagnostics usually involves clean tissue samples from known sources.
It can usually be repeated to resolve ambiguities. It involves comparison of
discrete alternatives (e.g., which of two alleles did a child inherent from a par-
ent?) and thus includes built-in consistency checks against artifacts. It requires
no knowledge of distribution of patterns in the general population.
[Vol. 35:767
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As in Andrews, the expert witnesses for the prosecution were
usually representatives of laboratories quite interested in seeing
DNA fingerprinting receive judicial acceptance.6 0 Their appearance
as the sole authorities in the courtroom regarding laboratory proce-
dure, statistical analysis, and basically all aspects of the technology
demonstrates the rather one-sided picture that was painted.
The paucity of defense experts and dissenting literature was
viewed as an indication of scientific acceptability, rather than as a
demonstration that scientists had not had the opportunity to ad-
dress this new technique satisfactorily 61 Ill-equipped defense at-
torneys, judges, and juries, therefore, were faced with a unilateral
barrage of complicated scientific evidence that placed the adver-
sarial system in peril. The next Section focuses on the tremendous
impact of this largely untested technology
THE IMPACT OF THE ADMISSION OF DNA FINGERPRINTING EVIDENCE
The strong probative value DNA evidence has in a trial provides
the strongest argument for scrutinizing the technology before al-
lowing admission. The lack of such scrutiny in the earliest DNA
cases unfortunately resulted in serious problems for criminal de-
fendants. e2 Courts effectively gave the prosecution carte blanche to
present complex, scientific evidence to juries without defense chal-
lenge. This unilateral presentation of such seemingly infallible evi-
dence essentially allowed expert witnesses for the prosecution to
control the outcome of early DNA fingerprinting trials.
Given the relative inexperience regarding scientific matters
throughout the legal system, one would expect fact finders, law-
yers, and judges to accord disproportionate value to scientific evi-
Forensic DNA typing often involves samples that are degraded, contami-
nated, or from multiple unknown sources. It sometimes cannot be repeated,
because there is too little sample. It often involves matching of samples from a
wide range of alternatives present in the population and thus lacks built-in
consistency checks. Except m cases where the DNA evidence excludes a sus-
pect, assessing the significance of a result requires statistical analysis of popu-
lation frequencies.
Id.
60. See, e.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1093 (1990).
61. See, e.g., Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849; Woodall, 385 S.E.2d at 260.
62. See supra notes 36-61 and accompanying text.
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dence connecting a defendant with a crime.6 s As a result, uncontro-
verted scientific evidence has an entirely unwarranted impact on
the disposition of a case. As one author has stated:
[L]awyers as a group evidence an appalling degree of scientific
illiteracy, which ill equips them to educate and guide the bench
in its decisions on admissibility of evidence proffered through
expert witnesses. This scientific illiteracy is shared by a large
segment of the trial and appellate bench; many judges simply do
not understand evidence based on scientific principles.6 4
One author described the dilemma facing defense attorneys in
cases involving the relatively pedantic scientific evidence of tradi-
tional ABO blood typing. "[W]hen it came to the scientific
testimony, the adversary system ceased to exist and the evidence
was not challenged. No defense witness testified about the se-
rological evidence. The relevant defense arguments were feeble." 66
A jury will not be truly informed by unilateral expert testimony
Furthermore, scientific evidence may have a disproportionate im-
pact on a jury even when both sides address the evidence lucidly
"[A]bout one quarter [of jurors who] were presented with scientific
evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would
have changed their verdicts-from guilty to not guilty ",67 Thus, in
early DNA fingerprinting cases, jurors already predisposed to agree
with the side proffering scientific testimony heard novel, compli-
cated, uncontroverted, expert scientific testimony from witnesses
who had a stake in seeing DNA evidence receive judicial
acceptance.
In certain instances, expert witnesses have been accused of offer-
ing imprecise scientific testimony For instance, in People v. Julbe,
63. See, e.g., People v. Kelly 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976) (noting that jurors "give
considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence when presented by 'experts' with impressive
credentials").
64. Jonakait, supra note 3, at 348 n.12 (quoting ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 7 (3d ed. 1986)) (alteration in original).
65. See id. at 343-45 (describing the author's impressions of an unreported Brooklyn,
New York case, People v. Julbe, No. 4167/1978 (Kings County, N.Y. 1979), based on trial
and appellate documents in his possession).
66. Id. at 348.
67. Id. at 345 n.7 (quoting Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic
Science in the Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987)) (altera-
tions in original).
[Vol. 35:767776
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the expert serologist was able to present population studies that
scientists had not viewed, effectively allowing the expert to espouse
his own theories as scientific truth."' Fortunately, in recent years,
scientists have called into question certain aspects of the DNA fin-
gerprinting process, leading some courts to subject the once un-
challenged technology to more exacting scrutiny 69
LATER SCRUTINY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING
There is no scientific dispute about the validity of the general
principles underlying DNA typing: scientists agree that DNA
varies substantially among humans, that variation can be de-
tected in the laboratory, and that DNA comparison can provide
a basis for distinguislng samples from different persons.70
Problems arise when the fingerprinting procedures themselves are
inherently faulty, when the process is not conducted correctly,
when there is a problem with the sample of DNA, or when the
results of the analysis are misinterpreted. Thus, although the sci-
ence behind DNA fingerprinting is sound, the application of the
science m the forensic arena is often questionable. Addressing
these concerns is of critical importance to the criminal justice field
because of the legal system's inability to cope with scientific evi-
dence, and the tendency of juries to grant often undue weight to
DNA evidence.71 Three areas of concern surrounding DNA evi-
dence have led several courts to question the admissibility of par-
ticular applications of the technology- (1) problems in controlling
the experimental conditions of the analysis,72 (2) problems in inter-
preting the results,7 3 and (3) concerns over Fourth Amendment
privacy rights. 4
68. Id. at 349. The author also asserts that "[t]he conclusions of forensic science are often
based on skimpy, nonexistent, or shoddy research." Id.
69. See infra notes 70-170 and accompanying text.
70. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 51.
71. Id. at 52 ("[T]he probative power of DNA typing can be so great that it can outweigh
all other evidence in a trial; and the procedures for DNA typing are complex, and judges
and juries cannot properly weigh and evaluate conclusions based on different standards of
[scientific] rigor.").
72. See infra notes 75-116 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 117-54 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 155-70 and accompanying text.
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Problems with Experimental Conditions
Sample Size
Although DNA evidence holds great promise for both correctly
identifying criminals and exculpating innocent persons, finger-
printing requires a sufficient sample size. 5 Lifecodes, one of the
three major private corporations conducting DNA fingerprinting,
admits that fifty percent of the rape cases sent to it produce no
result because of inadequate samples.7 6 This important point dem-
onstrates the limitations on a procedure that is often touted as a
panacea for criminal investigations. DNA proponents are quick to
note that the problem of sample size is irrelevant to control of the
experimental conditions of analysis because a small sample size
merely produces an inconclusive result. 77
Environmental Contamination
In the criminal area, DNA samples often are drawn from crime
scene evidence. As a result, samples often are exposed to the envi-
ronment or are aged. Scientists have concluded that "moisture and
bacteria degrade DNA and can make typing impossible. '78
Others have noted that exposure to light, heat, radiation and
chemical agents, as well as the aging process, also may degrade
DNA or cut it into small pieces, making testing difficult."9 DNA
fingerprinting proponents argue that, as with small samples, degra-
dation due to environmental and other factors results only m an
inability to make a reading, not in a false positive which could in-
75. The Cetus test, Polymerase Chain Reaction or Amplityping, can be conducted on a
very small sample size. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 17-8, at 122 (Supp. 1991).
76. Moss, supra note 32, at 67.
77. Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 13, at 919.
78. Moss, supra note 32, at 67 (citing Dr. David Housman, Professor of Biology at Mas-
sachussetts Institute of Technology).
79. See, e.g., Anthony Pearsall, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal
Trials, 77 CAL. L. RE v. 665, 668 (1989). The author provides the following example: "[B]lood
and semen stains kept at room temperature for periods of more than four years have not
produced usable prints, and the "window period" for obtaining usable sperm from vaginal
swabs has varied from two to forty-eight hours in controlled experiments." Id. (citations
omitted).
[Vol. 35:767
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criminate an innocent person.80 Countering this argument, scien-
tists caution that false positives may result from the introduction
of certain bacteria or the mixing of DNA samples."' The court in
Andrews v. State emphasized the practice of Lifecodes where
"control samples are employed throughout the process," increasing
the likelihood of discovering error, as further proof that DNA tests
were reliable.82
Proponents of DNA fingerprinting contend that mixing of sam-
ples (for instance, the semen of a rape suspect and the vaginal
fluids of a victim) is not a serious problem because scientists easily
can detect the mix and separate the two samples.83 Other problems
include mutations and the digestion of the sample DNA by the
enzyme introduced in the fingerprinting process.84 The consensus
appears to be that, except in extremely rare circumstances, a de-
fective sample produces no results, not a false positive.8 5
I
Laboratory Performance
Perhaps the most often mentioned problem surrounding DNA
evidence is the performance of the laboratories conducting the pro-
cess. "[F]orensic laboratories perform incredibly poorly according
to the available information."86 Although the theory behind DNA
identification is beyond reproach, 7 improper laboratory techniques
are certainly grounds for inadmissibility The value of DNA evi-
80. Id.
81. GIANNELLI & IIWINKELRIED, supra note 75, § 17-18, at 126.
82. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
83. Alec Jeffreys et al., Individual-Specific "Fingerprints" of Human DNA, 316 NATURE
76, 78 (1985); see also RESEARCH COUNCM, supra note 10, at 65-66 ("In mixed samples that
contain semen, it is possible to extract the sperm DNA and the DNA of vaginal epithelial
cells separately.").
84. Jeffreys et al., supra note 83, at 78.
85. See Pearsall, supra note 79, at 668. Perhaps the most serious potential for false posi-
tives is due to possible chain of custody problems. This problem, of course, is not inherent
in the fingerprinting process.
86. Jonakait, supra note 3, at 351.
87. See supra text accompanying note 70. "DNA doesn't lie. But by the time you scrape a
sample off a sidewalk and it goes through many steps of handling by people, things can go
wrong. The potential for human error does exist." William B. Falk, DNA and Truth,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 7, 1992, at 7 (quoting John Thornton, Professor of Forensic Science at the
University of California, Berkeley).
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dence is linked inextricably to the quality of the laboratory
processes.
Obviously, the worth of a scientific result is affected by how
likely it is to be wrong. The assessment of the conclusion that
two samples match and that only one in 35,000 have similar
DNA depends upon whether the forensic scientist is wrong 1%
or 10% or 25% of the time when he declares a match.18
The current lack of independent proficiency testing of the forensic
laboratories conducting DNA fingerprinting89 calls into question
the reliability of the various scientists, making the whole procedure
questionable.
The lack of independent auditing of DNA laboratories in-
troduces the concern that, although DNA analysis itself is widely
researched and accepted because of its many scientific applica-
tions, "most of the probes used in criminal and paternity cases
have no other medical application."90 The differences inherent
in forensic DNA introduce doubt regarding the extent of "scientific
acceptance" necessary for scientific evidence to be admissible. One
author, David H. Kaye, has even questioned how the various courts
have framed the "scientific acceptance" standard. 91 Kaye writes
that if "all that need be accepted is the theoretical basis for DNA
identification, there is no doubt that the technique is potentially
admissible."92 He continues, however, by noting that it is not gen-
erally accepted that the techniques used to analyze DNA are infal-
lible as used. s The courts might be unclear about exactly what
they are admitting into evidence when they admit procedures in-
cluded under the umbrella of DNA fingerprinting.
88. Jonakait, supra note 3, at 350.
89. Id., see also Falk, supra note 87, at 7 (noting that m a 1990 test of the proficiency of
DNA laboratories, conducted by the California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors,
Cellmark incorrectly matched the DNA in two of 100 samples).
90. David H. Kaye, The Admissibility of DNA Testing, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 353, 358
(1991). Basically, a probe is the device used to identify polymorphic loci of DNA and is
therefore indispensable to DNA fingerprinting. "A probe is a short piece of a single strand
of DNA with a radioactive or other readily identifiable component attached, like a sticker or
tag on a suitcase." Id. at 354.
91. Id. at 359.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Several organizations intimately associated with DNA finger-
printing have initiated studies to address the problem of unregu-
lated laboratories. The National Research Council published a
comprehensive study of DNA technology in the summer of 1992.11
Although recommending the continued use of DNA analysis for fo-
rensic purposes, including the resolution of both criminal and civil
cases, this group urged adoption of certain improvements and
changes.95
In its study, the National Research Council succinctly identified
the major hurdle that DNA fingerprinting must overcome: "DNA
typing is capable, in principle, of an extremely low inherent rate of
false-positive results, so the risk of error will come from poor labo-
ratory practice or sample handling and labeling; and because DNA
typing is technical, a jury requires the assurance of laboratory
competence in test results."9" To address this concern, the Council
recommended "some degree of standardization of laboratory proce-
dures . to assure the courts of high-quality results. ' '97 The
Council also called for the development and adoption of detailed
quality control mechanisms by every laboratory involved in DNA
fingerprinting to monitor laboratory work and to ensure consistent
reliability of DNA typing techniques."" The report also suggested a
mandatory accreditation program under government supervision
for each DNA typing method used.9 "Lack of accreditation should
be considered to constitute a prima facie case that a laboratory has
not complied with generally accepted standards."'100 The Council
intended this suggestion to deal with privately operated laborato-
ries that consistently cite trade secrecy as an excuse for rejecting
oversight of their operations. 10' Also concerned with the approach
that several early courts had taken to the admissibility of DNA
fingerprinting evidence, the report stated that " 'the adequacy of
94. See RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10.
95. See Gina Kolata, Chief Says Panel Backs Courts' Use of a Genetic Test, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1992, at Al.
96. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 98.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 108.
99. Id. at 109.
100. Id.
101. See Ira Pilchen, Federal Report and Court Rulings Intensify DNA Evidence De-
bate, 76 JUDICATURE 41, 41 (1992).
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laboratory procedures and of the competence of the experts who
testify'" should be open to inquiry on a case-by-case basis.0 2 The
report identified the clear need for monitoring laboratories and for
stricter examinations of the specific procedures used before DNA
evidence is admitted in court.103
Commentators have addressed extensively the problem of un-
supervised laboratories. The Office of Technology Assessment con-
cluded that "[d]etermining the type of controls necessary to ensure
confidence in the results of any single DNA typing of a forensic
specimen is of the highest priority -'104 Other critics wrote that ade-
quate standards, controls and validation research for forensic DNA
testing are not yet in place. 0 5 Given the current debate over labo-
ratory standards and controls, still another author has suggested
declaring per se inadmissible the findings of laboratories with no
established track record on independently administered profi-
ciency tests. 0 6 According to this author, this approach will induce
less reliable laboratories to enhance the proficiency of their
practices." 7
Some of the more recent court decisions regarding the admissi-
bility of DNA fingerprinting evidence clearly demonstrate a con-
cern over inadequate laboratory practices. In State v. Schwartz, 08
the Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to admit DNA evidence
because of faulty laboratory procedures. 10 9 Although conceding
that "DNA typing ha[d] gained general acceptance in the scientific
community," the court held that "the laboratory in [Schwartz] did
not comport with [appropriate standards]." 110 The court was con-
cerned with the laboratory's secrecy regarding its testing data and
102. Id. (citation omitted).
103. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 109.
104. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA
TESTS 63 (1990).
105. See William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, The Meaning of a Match: Sources of Am-
biguity in the Interpretation of DNA Prints, in FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 146 (Mark A.
Farly & James J. Harrington eds., 1991) (discussing the lack of standardization).
106. Kaye, supra note 90, at 359.
107. Id. at 359-60.
108. 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
109. Id. at 428.
110. Id.
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results and its admission to having made two false identifications
during proficiency testing."'
In People v. Castro,"2 the defense successfully attacked the lab-
oratory procedures that Lifecodes used in its DNA analysis." 3 The
defense assailed Lifecodes' use of contaminated probes and the ab-
sence of any laboratory controls." 4 Although, the court issued the
standard ruling that the theory behind DNA analysis was sound," 5
the defense team's arguments about the technology's application
swayed the court. "In a piercing attack upon each molecule of evi-
dence presented, the defense was successful in demonstrating to
this court that the testing laboratory failed in its responsibility to
perform the accepted scientific techniques and experiments." 116
These cases demonstrate the legal system's recognition of the dan-
gers of blind admission of DNA evidence.
Problems in Interpreting DNA Testing Results
If two DNA fingerprints differ, they clearly were derived from
two different human beings. If two DNA fingerprints are identical,
however, the samples from which the DNA was taken did not nec-
essarily originate in the same person. "[I]f two samples are
indistinguishable with regard to the detected DNA patterns, two
possibilities exist: the two samples came from the same person (or
from identical twins), or the two samples came from different per-
sons whose DNA patterns in the target regions investigated are the
same." 1 7 Thus, when a DNA fingerprint obtained from a crime
scene is indistinguishable from a DNA fingerprint obtained from a
sample provided by the defendant in a criminal trial, the case is
not over. Recognizing this inherent problem, one author noted that
"[t]he uniqueness of [DNA] 'fingerprints' can be truly established
only by testing of all individuals, both living and dead. Clearly this
is not possible, yet anything less leaves open the hypothetical pos-
111. Id. at 426-27.
112. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
113. Id. at 996.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 995.
116. Id.
117. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 44.
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sibility of an unobserved duplication."' l The prosecutor must pro-
vide the trier of fact with an estimate of the likelihood that the
defendant can be connected accurately with the crime scene. This
estimate is obtained through statistics generated from population
genetics, which attempt to determine the statistical probability
that more than one person in the population has the identical
DNA pattern at issue.119 The procedure poses the question: "What
is the chance of picking at random a person who has the same ge-
netic patterns as found in the evidence sample9' 1 20
The resulting probability has tremendous power to affect the
outcome of the case. "The power of DNA typing lies not only in its
ability to match samples, but also in its ability to represent accu-
rately the probability that a declared match will occur at random
in a specific population group."'' When a scientist stands before a
typical criminal trial jury and proclaims that only one Caucasian in
59,000,000 "has the same distinctive DNA components [as those]
found in the DNA comparison test,"' 2 the jury clearly pays very
careful attention. 123 The method that DNA laboratories use to in-
terpret their results, therefore, is perhaps the most important
phase of DNA fingerprinting analysis.
Courts recently have begun to question the methods laboratories
employ for calculating the significance of DNA matches. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court provided a lucid examination of the
problem in Commonwealth v. Curnin. 2 4 In Curnin, the court be-
gan by emphasizing the impact of statistical probability evidence
on juries: "Evidence of this nature, based on the scientific principle
that every human has unique genetic characteristics and having an
aura of infallibility, must have a strong impact on a jury ",125 In-
118. George F Sensabaugh, Forensic Biology-Is Recombinant DNA Technology in Its
Future?, 31 J. FORENSIC Sci. 393, 395 (1986).
119. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
120. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 44. "Obviously, the lower the probability [of
picking a person at random with the same genetic pattern], the stronger the inference that
the evidence sample is associated with a particular person who has those patterns." Id.
121. Dougherty, supra note 17, at 290.
122. Commonwealth v. Curnm, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Mass. 1991).
123. This statement reflects the majority opinion of Justice Wilkins regarding the use of
,staggering probabilities in DNA analysis. Id.
124. 565 N.E. 2d 440 (Mass. 1991).
125. Id. at 441.
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deed, a juror subconsciously may disregard most other evidence
when the prosecution introduces astounding DNA fingerprinting
statistics. The court reasoned that the impact of the incredible
figures associated with DNA evidence demands a strict scrutiny of
the statistical formulations that the laboratories proffer. 126 The
court concluded that
there is no demonstrated general acceptance or inherent ration-
ality of the process by which Cellmark [the laboratory at issue]
arrived at its conclusion that one Caucasian in 59,000,000 would
have the DNA components disclosed by the test that showed an
identity between the defendant's DNA and that found [at the
crime scene] .127
The court's dissatisfaction with Cellmark's statistical approach
stemmed from the prosecutor's failure tb present experts in the
field of population genetics to support Cellmark's conclusion. 128
Cellmark also had not published for scientific criticism a study of
its data base. A study would have detailed the compilation of DNA
samples used to determine the statistical probability of the print at
issue appearing randomly in the population. 29 In its statistical
analysis, Celmark employed the product rule. 930 It determined, al-
lele by allele, the frequency of the particular variation in its data
126. See id. "The erroneous admission of such evidence would undoubtedly be prejudicial
in any case where, as here, the identification of the person who committed the crime is in
serious dispute." Id.
127. Id. at 442.
128. Id. at 443-44. ("There is no showing, however, that scientists agree generally that the
distribution of the alleles disclosed m Cellmark's testing is random in the Caucasian popula-
tion so as to warrant the calculations made by Cellmark.").
129. Id. at 444 ("To determine the frequency with which alleles [gene patterns] shown on
a [DNA fingerprinting] test appear m the population, one must have gathered and main-
tamed parallel DNA information in a data base.").
130. Id.
The product rule states the probabilities of the joint occurrence of several sta-
tistically independent events. Here, assuming the product rule should be used,
the product of the frequency in the population base of each allele disclosed in
the DNA test would produce the frequency of the combination of the alleles
found. That is what, according to Cellmark [the laboratory in the case], pro-
duced the probability of one in 59,000,000 in this case.
Id. at 444 n.10. For instance, if one allele has a one-m-200 probability of appearing in the
population base and a second allele has a one-in-100,000 probability of appearing in the
population base, then the product rule yields a probability of both occurring in the same
person at one in 20,000,000.
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base. Next, the Cellmark scientists extrapolated that figure for the
population as a whole to arrive at the probability of another indi-
vidual having the same DNA characteristics as those revealed in
the DNA fingerprinting analysis.' Cellmark filled its data base of
Caucasians by conducting DNA fingerprinting tests on 200 blood
samples provided by a New York City blood bank.132 According to
the defendant's expert, this data base was not adequate to produce
an estimate of the frequency of a particular genetic print in the
human population. 133 The inadequacy stemmed from the fact that
certain tests revealed missing alleles, yet the data base did not re-
flect such a possibility 134
The debate surrounding population substructuring seems to
have influenced courts considering challenges to statistical formu-
lations. Population substructuring stems from the different world
population groups that comprise the American population. "The
major ethnic groupings are each composites of many different
subpopulations, which might have quite different frequencies of
the alleles used in forensic DNA typing."' 3 5 The argument for tak-
ing subpopulations into account is that the allele frequencies found
in the whole population of a given race likely will differ from the
allele frequencies of the various subpopulations.'36
The court in Currnn framed the subpopulation question as
"whether there is significant substructuring (subgroups) within ra-
cial groups that would affect probability determinations using
Cellmark's data base, and, if so, whether an acceptable statistical
adjustment could be made to account for it."' 7 The defendant's
expert recommended that data bases be comprised of a geographi-
131. Id. at 444.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 48.
136. See Lempert, supra note 10, at 307. Lempert explains subpopulations as follows:
[D]ata bases consisting of American Blacks might not adequately assess the
likelihood that the evidence DNA profile would characterize a randomly se-
lected West Indian Black when the defendant whose DNA matches the evi-
dence DNA is a West Indian. Similar arguments may be made about extending
analyses from Hispanic data bases to, for example, Cubans or generalized Cau-
casian data bases to Sicilians.
Id.
137. Curni, 565 N.E.2d at 444.
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cally representative population. 3 s An expert witness in United
States v. Yee, 39 Dr. Daniel L. Hartl, noted that the Caucasian
population of the United States consists of ethnically different
subpopulations which may differ in allele frequency 140 The exis-
tence of subpopulations calls into question unrepresentative data
bases, which may not reflect accurately the genetic substructures
of certain ethnic groups. 41 The court also acknowledged the con-
clusion of Professor Richard C. Lewontin that marriage patterns
have not substantially reduced genetic differentiations of the an-
cestral populations of American Caucasians. 42
In addition to reiterating the claims of Lewontin and Hartl, the
California case of People v. Barney4 ' discussed the contrary view
in the scientific community Although conceding the presence of
substructuring within data bases, two scientists, Ranajit
Chakrabory and Kenneth K. Kidd, contend that "its effect on the
reliability of frequency estimates is 'trivial' and 'cannot be de-
tected in practice.' -144 The courts in both Barney and Curnn rec-
ognized the substantial disagreement in the scientific community
regarding genetic substructuring and subgroup differences in allele
frequencies. The debate demonstrates that Celmark's method for
statistical determinations does not necessarily meet the standard
of scientific reliability required by Daubert.145 In fact, the court in
Barney described the debate as "bitter" and "raging.' 1 4 This lack
of scientific unanimity led the courts in the above cases to declare
the DNA evidence inadmissible.
138. Id. Curnm was a Massachusetts case in which the data base was taken from a New
York City blood bank. Id.
139. 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
140. Curnt, 565 N.E.2d at 445 n.12" (citing an unpublished article written by Dr. Hartl).
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Ct. App. 1992).
144. Id. at 741 (citing Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA
Typing in Forensic Work, SCIENCE, Dec. -20, 1991, at 1735).
145. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
146. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 741.
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Proposed Solutions to Problems of Interpreting the Results
In Caldwell v. State,147 after deciding that the underlying princi-
ples of DNA fingerprinting were sound and that the procedures
present in that particular case were adequate, the Georgia Su-
preme Court assailed the laboratory's statistical calculations. 14
The laboratory concluded that the probability of a randomly se-
lected person having the same DNA fingerprint as the defendant
was one in 24,000,000.14" The court took issue with the paucity of
expert analysis of the laboratory's data bank,150 and ruled that the
conclusions were inconsistent with the data base. The court m-
stead ruled that the more conservative figure of one in 250,000,
more in line with the data base, would have to be used.
15
The Caldwell decision introduced one possible, albeit temporary,
solution to the problem of calculating DNA profile frequencies.
"The solution is not to bar DNA evidence [for reasons of inac-
curate probability calculations], but to ensure that estimates of the
probability that a match between a person's DNA and evidence
DNA could occur by chance are appropriately conservative."'
15 2
Echoing this observation, an expert in the case of United States v.
Yee' 5 3 stated that "[a]ll available evidence shows that in a DNA
fingerprinting case, the chance of a match by coincidence alone is
very small. The very conservative computational methods
used by [the laboratory in that case] more than compensate for
any theoretical deviation.' 1 54 One solution, therefore, is merely to
adjust the figures so as to minimize the impact of an overwhelm-
ingly incriminating result.
147. 393 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990).
148. Id. at 443-44.
149. Id. at 443.
150. See id. at 443-44 (ruling that unless some supporting testimony was provided, the
probability calculations were not acceptable).
151. Id. at 444.
152. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 134 (discussing the various remedies for the
problems associated with inflated probability results).
153. 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
154. Rorie Sherman, DNA Is on Trial Yet Again, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 1, 10
(chronicling the conclusions of the expert, Mr. Stephen Daiger, regarding the adequacy of
conservative estimates and his thoughts about Yee).
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Fourth Amendment Privacy Concerns
The DNA fingerprint has been criticized as a tool for the inva-
sion of basic privacy rights. The critiques focus on the compulsory
testing of body tissue and fluids of criminal suspects and the po-
tential revelation of certain genetic information contained in the
DNA fingerprint.
Compulsory Blood Tests
A DNA fingerprint may be taken whenever body fluids or tissue
are found at a crime scene. To be useful, however, this fingerprint
must be compared against a fingerprint generated from the DNA
of a suspect. To make this comparison, law enforcement officials
must be able to take blood or tissue samples from the suspect.
This procedure raises Fourth Amendment concerns, specifically
with regard to unreasonable searches.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that citizens shall be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures and that "no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause."'155 The Supreme Court has
deemed the extraction of a blood sample, the most common
method for obtaining a DNA fingerprint from a suspect, 156 a search
for Fourth Amendment purposes.1 57 In Schmerber v. California,
the United States Supreme Court deemed the compulsory extrac-
tion of a blood sample for an alcohol test a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment, as long as probable cause was pre-
sent.158 In Schmerber, the Court ruled that no warrant was re-
quired because of the need to test quickly the suspect's blood
before the body had absorbed the alcohol.'59
Such exigent circumstances are absent in the context of DNA
fingerprints. For a mandatory blood test to obtain a DNA finger-
print to clear the Fourth Amendment hurdle, there apparently,
must be both probable cause and a valid search warrant. The prob-
able cause existing at a suspect's arrest allows law enforcement of-
155. U.S. CONST. amend. IV
156. In every reported criminal case using DNA evidence through 1990, blood samples
were used in the DNA analysis. Renskers, supra note 1, at 323 n.98.
157. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
158. Id. at 771.
159. Id. at 770-71.
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ficials to obtain a warrant for blood extraction.160 Thus, privacy
rights of a clear suspect are not jeopardized significantly
More recently, when deciding Fourth Amendment issues the Su-
preme Court has expressed a willingness to balance individual
rights versus government interests.' This approach becomes criti-
cally important in cases lacking a clear suspect. The balancing test
indicates a degree of deference to law enforcement investigative
techniques that has some commentators worried about abandoning
the need for individualized suspicion.162 For instance, if a suspect's
race could be determined from a DNA fingerprint generated from
crime scene evidence, mass arrests of citizens from one racial group
might follow, with reckless disregard for probable cause.6 3 The
courts, however, remain committed to the requirement of individu-
alized suspicion.6 In any event, currently produced DNA finger-
prints contain negligible information about an individual's per-
sonal characteristics and certainly not enough to warrant concerns
about mass arrests.16 5
Prwate Genetic Informatin
Because DNA contains information about the most fundamental
characteristics of human beings, a DNA fingerprint conceivably
could reveal damaging personal and medical information. Certain
DNA analyses can diagnose inherited afflictions, including cystic
160. Id. at 770.
161. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding that drug
and alcohol tests required by the Federal Railway Administration's regulations were reason-
able because the government's compelling interest outweighed the employees' privacy
concern).
162. Renskers, supra note 1, at 325.
163. Id. at 328.
[I]t has been suggested that "[o]nce [DNA fingerprinting] is widely accepted,
police departments may try to clear unsolved cases by simply demanding tissue
samples from everyone living within a high-crime area. Refusal to submit, like
the unwillingness to take a polygraph test, may be taken as unofficial evidence
of guilt."
Id. (quoting Hotz, Courts to Rule on Whether 'DNA Fingerprints' Valid, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Oct. 6, 1987, at 22A) (footnote omitted).
164. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 970 (D.C. Cir.) (condemning "[t]he prac-
tice of making dragnet arrests"), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
165. See Renskers, supra note 1, at 334.
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fibrosis and some inherited cancers.16 6 Scientists someday may de-
velop the ability to identify the presence of certain other medical
conditions including alcoholism, heart disease, and diabetes.
1 67
"Obviously, such information could lead to discrimination by in-
surance companies, employers, or others against people with par-
ticular traits."16 The current techniques used for DNA finger-
printing analysis in the criminal context do not pose this problem,
and therefore DNA fingerprints are not examined for medical con-
ditions."69 "Substantive information, such as genetically linked dis-
eases, cannot be obtained from the resulting print, unless the tech-
nician originally sought to look for that information by choosing
certain probes and enzymes. ' °170 However, future fingerprinting
techniques could provide private information about the donor.
Clear restrictions on the distribution of fingerprinting information,
or close control of testing techniques could handle this problem.
This discussion of the various points of concern surrounding
DNA fingerprinting evidence introduces an examination of Vir-
ginia's approach to the technology Only through an understanding
of how other states have addressed the potential problems associ-
ated with this exciting and theoretically sound technique can one
accurately assess Virginia's performance in the past in admitting
DNA fingerprinting evidence both judicially and legislatively, and
in the future, as it grapples with the appropriate use of the Vir-
ginia DNA data base.
166. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 114.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 155.
The current use of DNA technology appears to pose no greater threat to the
right of privacy than does normal fingerprinting, placement of photographs in
evidence, collection of blood or saliva samples, or other established forensic
techniques. DNA technology is not different in principle from those other tech-
niques, although it holds the promise of providing a more definitive identifica-
tion than most others
Id.
170. JoAnn M. Longobardi, Note, DNA Fingerprinting and the Need for a National
Data Base, 17 FORDHAM Uaa. L.J. 323, 353 (1989) (footnote omitted).
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VIRGINIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF DNA FINGERPRINTING
Judicial Acceptance
The Virginia Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility of
DNA fingerprinting evidence in the trilogy of Spencer v. Common-
wealth cases. 171 In the first of these cases, decided in 1989, the Vir-
ginia court seized the opportunity to declare DNA fingerprinting
admissible as a reliable scientific technique.172
Spencer, the defendant, was convicted of capital murder, rape,
and burglary 173 A significant portion of the prosecution's case at
trial revolved around a determination that the DNA fingerprint ex-
tracted from semen stains found at the crime scene matched the
DNA fingerprint taken from a sample of Spencer's blood. 74 On ap-
peal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Spencer challenged the admis-
sibility of the novel scientific technique, a case of first impression
in the Commonwealth. 7 " After outlining the process of DNA fin-
gerprinting, the court discussed its rationale in admitting the sci-
entific evidence.' 76
First, the court was satisfied with the statistical analysis per-
formed by Lifecodes, the laboratory conducting the DNA analysis
in the case.'77 Lifecodes used a standard data base, presumably
with little concern for subpopulations."78 Additionally, Lifecodes
employed the product rule in establishing its probability that a
random person had the same DNA fingerprint as the one extri-
cated from the crime scene. 7 ' Population geneticists have chal-
171. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989) ("Spencer I"), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1036 (1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989) ("Spencer IF'),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 850 (Va. 1989)
("Spencer III"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
172. Spencer I, 384 S.E.2d at 783.
173. Id. at 776.
174. Id. at 777.
175. Id. at 781.
176. Id. at 781-83.
177. Id. at 782.
178. The court noted that "DNA data bases were maintained in three categories: Negro,
Caucasian, and Hispanic." Id. This categorization indicates that, at the time, neither the
court nor Lifecodes was very concerned with the possibility of population substructures
within each of the three categories.
179. The process was described as follows: "Using population genetics equations stan-
dardized in the early 1900's, the individual frequencies are combined to determine the sta-
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lenged the failure to account for population substructures in inter-
preting the results of the DNA analysis as producing inaccurate
statistical probabilities.'
The defense's failure to present any expert witnesses of its own
to dispute the technology as applied to Spencer may explain the
court's ready acceptance of these population genetics and of
Lifecodes' laboratory procedures.' 8 ' In fact, one of the three ex-
perts for the prosecution was an employee of Lifecodes. 182 Like
many of the first courts to consider this wondrous technology, this
court arguably was uneducated in the difficult task of distinguish-
ing a misapplication of the technology from a proper use. As a re-
sult, all aspects of the prosecution's DNA evidence progressed un-
scathed through the proceeding.' 83 This result typified early DNA
cases across the country, where defense counsel, dissenting author-
ities, and the judiciary were not yet prepared to counter bold pros-
ecution assertions. 84 Many courts, and arguably the court in Spen-
cer, viewed the absence of defense experts as an indication of the
scientific community's unanimous support of all the technology's
applications. Population geneticists' and scientists' growing criti-
cism of certain aspects of the DNA fingerprinting process have
shown this assumption to be somewhat misguided. 85
In determining admissibility, the court looked at whether the
technique was considered "reliable within the scientific commu-
nity "i8 Although the court noted that it would have admitted the
evidence under even the Frye standard, 87 the court's reliability
standard seems far less exacting than one approximating general
tistical likelihood of the several different DNA fragments appearing m the same sample."
Id.
180. For a discussion of the product rule and population substructures, see supra notes
130-46 and accompanying text.
181. Spencer I, 384 S.E.2d at 783 ("Spencer acknowledges that he 'was unable to find
or produce one qualified expeit to debunk either the theory of DNA printing or the statis-
tics generated therefrom.' ").
182. Id. at 782.
183. The court ruled that the prosecution's evidence was "undisputed" and therefore af-
firmed the trial court's decision to admit the DNA evidence. Id.
184. For a discussion of the early acceptance of DNA Fingerprinting, see supra notes 48-
61 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 70-154 and accompanying text.
186. Spencer I, 384 S.E.2d at 782.
187. Id. (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
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acceptance in the scientific community Furthermore, the standard
enunciated by the court, "reliable within the scientific commu-
nity," may be misapplied if the theory behind DNA fingerprinting,
universally recognized as beyond reproach, is confused with the
questionable procedures actually employed in a specific case.
The Virginia Supreme Court rushed to admit this novel scien-
tific evidence, a decision whose soundness is at the very least de-
batable considering more recent information. The Common-
wealth's infatuation with DNA fingerprinting, a technology that
certainly can aid in the law enforcement effort, became even more
evident as the legislature enacted a law declaring DNA fingerprint-
ing evidence admissible.
Legislatwe Enactment
During its 1990 session, the Virginia General Assembly enacted
Code section 19.2-270.5,188 addressing DNA admissibility in crimi-
nal proceedings. The section provides:
In any criminal proceeding, DNA testing shall be deemed
to be a reliable scientific technique and the evidence of a DNA
profile comparison may be admitted to prove or disprove the
identity of any person. This section shall not otherwise limit the
introduction of any relevant evidence bearing upon any question
at issue before the court. The court shall, regardless of the re-
sults of the DNA analysis, if any, consider such other relevant
evidence of the identity of the accused as shall be admissible in
evidence."8 9
This Code provision was challenged very recently before the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court in Satcher v. Commonwealth.190 The defend-
ant in Satcher contended that the language of section 19.2-270.5
creates "an evidentiary presumption that impermissibly shifts the
burden of proof."' 91 The defendant argued that the statute auto-
matically admits DNA evidence without regard to the particular
circumstances surrounding the prosecution's DNA fingerprinting.
The court refused to interpret the statute in this manner and em-
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (Michie 1990).
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. 421 S.E.2d 821 (Va. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1319 (1993).
191. Id. at 834.
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phasized that the phrase "DNA evidence may be admitted" indi-
cated the court's discretion to judge particular circumstances. 192
The court went on to rule that DNA evidence "shall be considered
or treated as a reliable scientific technique."193 Such a reading, the
court argued, "neither creates a presumption nor shifts the burden
of proof.' 19
4
Satcher, a late 1992 case, evidences the extent of a defense
team's ability to muster a reasonable response to what was once
the prosecution's sole domain. The defense introduced an expert
who testified that the
DNA methodology currently in use can result in mixed samples
and laboratory errors, that two different laboratories may come
up with two different results, and that the data base used to
calculate the probability of a random match failed to reflect ac-
curately "the frequency of the genes in the relevant
population."1 95
Another defense expert noted that the data base did not account
for the existence of subpopulations.'9 6 Although the court ruled
under the relevancy standard of admissibility that the threat of
prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the
DNA fingerprinting evidence, 1 the defense credibly introduced
important caveats regarding DNA fingerprinting that went unno-
ticed as recently as Spencer Li98
Unequivocally, the court did not interpret the legislation as a
per se admission of DNA evidence under all circumstances. Al-
though perhaps acting prematurely in their initial discussion of
DNA in Spencer, the Virginia courts appear to have thoughtfully
reconsidered the issue and important ramifications of admitting
DNA fingerprinting technology, particularly for a defendant con-
fronted with this powerful incriminating evidence.
192. Id. at 834-35 (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 835 (citing the testimony of expert witness Dr, Ronald T. Acton).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Spencer 1, 384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989).
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THE DNA DATA BANK. SOLUTION OR INVASION OF PRIVACY9
Legislatin
In 1990, the Virginia legislature established a state DNA data
bank and procedures for the "collection, analysis, and exchange of
DNA information for the purpose of criminal law enforcement. '"' "
The provisions for the data bank generally require that all con-
victed felons submit blood samples for DNA analysis.2 00 The stat-
ute applies to all persons convicted of a felony on or after July 1,
1990, all felons incarcerated as of that date, and all sex offenders
convicted under certain code sections and incarcerated on or after
July 1, 1989.201 The statute also provides specific procedures for
withdrawing blood samples and exacting requirements regarding
identification and storage of samples.0 2 Additionally, the statute
mandates that "the DNA analysis [be conducted] in accordance
with procedures adopted by the Bureau [of Forensic Science]" to
ensure that recognized laboratory procedures are followed. 0 3 The
statute also provides for the exchange of DNA information with
other data banks, and for the creation of a statistical data base,
among others.0 4
Purposes of the Data Bank
The stated reason for the creation of the Virginia DNA data
bank is to "address the problem of felony recidivism in Virginia by
identifying and increasing the likelihood of convicting repeat of-
fenders and deterring those who might otherwise commit a second
felony "205 The Commonwealth's recitation of statistics regarding
felony recidivism prompted the legislature to direct the data base
program at convicted felons. A study of violent felons convicted in
Virginia between 1985 and 1987 observed that 36.4% of them had
at least one prior felony conviction, only 26% had no prior crimi-
199. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 304 (4th Cir.), cert. dented, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992); see
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-310.2 to 310.7 (Michie 1990).
200. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 1990).
201. Id.
202. Id. § 19.2-310.3.
203. Id. § 19.2-310.4.
204. Id. § 19.2-310.5.
205. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 304 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992).
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nal record, and just over 19% had been convicted for nonviolent
felonies.206 In addition, a United States Justice Department survey
of more than half of those persons released in 1983 from the pris-
ons of eleven states estimated that 62.5% were arrested again for a
felony or serious misdemeanor within three years after release. °7
Because convicted felons are more likely than are other members
of the population to commit another crime, it behooves Virginia to
retain the felons' DNA fingerprints on file to deter future criminal
behavior and to increase the likelihood of capturing repeat
offenders.
Other rationales for establishing a data base reflect the argu-
ments for the general application of DNA technology to the crimi-
nal justice arena. DNA technology is the best available means to
both inculpate and exculpate suspects.20 8 It also will "reduce to in-
significance the standard alibi defense" and will "tend to reduce
the importance of eyewitness testimony," much maligned as hope-
lessly inaccurate. 20 9 DNA evidence also undoubtedly will increase
the number of guilty pleas, easing the burden on an already over-
crowded court system.210
The data base will aid law enforcement tremendously, in much
the same way the traditional fingerprint file currently helps inves-
tigators. Professor Edward Imwinkelried has stated that
[u]ntil a national data base is established, DNA typing's value
as an investigative tool is minimal. The thing that makes
[traditional] fingerprinting such a fantastic investigative tool is
that the FBI is sitting on over 100 million sets of [traditional]
fingerprints in its files. So if you go out to a crime scene,
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. For instance, in December 1992, a Suffolk County, New York court released Kerry
Kotler, who, based on DNA fingerprinting, had been convicted of rape, because two labora-
tories determined after new tests that Kotler was not the rapist. Michael Slackman, DA
Draws Fire in DNA Case, NEWSDAY, Dec. 14, 1992, at 7. The FBI notes that DNA analysis
exonerates 35% of rape suspects. KESSLER, supra note 31, at 255 (citing Robert L. Gleason,
a section chief in the FBI laboratory division).
209. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Albany County Ct. 1988).
210. See id., see also Elizabeth M. Bezak, Note, DNA Profiling Evidence: The Need for a
Uniform and Workable Evidentiary Standard of Admissibility, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 595, 598
n.16 (1992) ("[Ihe potential for plea bargaining or a guilty plea by parties increases as
more defendants are confronted with DNA profiling results.").
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and you don't have any idea who's guilty, you send it into the
FBI and they come back with your suspect.21'
When investigators have no suspects, the ability to compare DNA
fingerprints taken from crime scene evidence with millions of DNA
fingerprints stored in a centralized data base clearly will be an in-
valuable tool.
The idea of a DNA data bank is quite inviting. Its capacity for
improving law enforcement, however, will not be realized until the
nagging questions surrounding DNA fingerprinting technology are
answered. The next Section, therefore, discusses how Virginia's
DNA data bank will address the problems of controlling the exper-
imental conditions of the DNA analysis, the difficulties in inter-
preting the results, and the Fourth Amendment privacy concerns.
Problems with Experimental Conditions
The lack of laboratory standardization is one of the most press-
ing concerns surrounding DNA fingerprinting.1 i The wording of
the Virginia DNA data bank statute reveals the Commonwealth's
concern with the past performance of some laboratories involved in
DNA fingerprinting and evidences Virginia's commitment to stan-
dardized laboratory procedures. The statute provides clear guide-
lines for the personnel213 and for conducting the extraction, 214 la-
belling, and storage of blood samples. 15 In addition, the DNA
211. Moss, supra note 32, at 70.
212. See supra notes 75-116 and accompanying text.
213. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.3 (Michie 1990) ("Only a correctional health nurse
technician or a physician, registered professional nurse, licensed practical nurse, graduate
laboratory technician, or phlebotomist shall withdraw any sample to be submitted for
analysis.").
214. See id. ("Chemically clean sterile disposable needles and vacuum draw tubes shall be
used for all samples.").
215. Id.
The [draw] tube shall be sealed and labelled with the subject's name, social
security number, date of birth, race and gender, the name of the person col-
lecting the sample, the date and place of collection. The tubes shall be secured
to prevent tampering with the contents. The samples shall be transported
to the Bureau of Forensic Science not more than fifteen days following with-
drawal and shall be analyzed and stored in the DNA data bank
[Vol. 35:767
DNA FINGERPRINTING
analysis itself is to be conducted according to the standardized
procedures of the Bureau of Forensic Science.216
According to the Commonwealth, having the State in charge of
extracting blood samples, completing the analysis, and storing the
DNA fingerprint removes the danger of poor laboratory proce-
dure.21 Laboratories involved m the data base program are re-
quired to follow strictly the procedures of the Bureau of Forensic
Science. Although this argument might not impress free market-
eers, with at least some record of standard procedures utilized in
DNA analysis, reviewing courts will be better able to measure the
harmful effects of any deviation.
The existence of standardized state laboratories also lessens the
risk, at least in cases involving defendants whose fingerprints are
on file with the Commonwealth, of unscrupulous laboratories act-
ing to promote DNA technology rather than seek accurate results
in any given case. In early DNA cases, experts were almost exclu-
sively from commercial laboratories, and therefore had an interest
in the technology's success. 218 Having laboratory technicians from
a state laboratory could help alleviate this problem. The standard-
ized procedures necessary for a successful data base program re-
duce the possibility of poor laboratory performance interfering
with the sound theoretical underpinnings of DNA fingerprinting.
Problems in Interpreting the Results
Inaccurate statistical interpretation of the results of DNA analy-
sis has led several courts to question the accuracy of the entire
process.2 1 9 One of the most pronounced problems in this area is
that unrepresentative data bases do not account for the possibility
of population substructuring.220 The Virginia data bank program
216. Id. § 19.2-310.4.
217. Id.
218. Renskers, supra note 1, at 318-19.
219. See supra notes 124-54 and accompanying text.
220. In the recent case of People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Ct. App. 1992), the data
base used by the FBI, which conducted the DNA analysis, was composed of 300 people from
three Southern states. Some argue that such a data base is not sufficiently representative
because of population substructuring. Id. at 740. Ethnic subgroups within each racial group
tend to marry similar people, whether they be people of like religion, ethnicity or geographi-
cal location. Id. If people were to mate randomly within their racial group, then presumably
a data base compiled of 300 African Americans from the South would be a perfectly accept-
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calls for a creation of a statistical data base from the blood samples
extracted for the fingerprint file.22' Such a data base presumably
will contain a larger sample that will make statistical analysis more
accurate. In addition, because the data base will be composed of
Virginians, fewer problems of geographical representation will oc-
cur. Separate data bases conceivably could be created for the vari-
ous subgroups within each racial group. Although improving the
statistical analysis of DNA testing is not a primary goal of the Vir-
ginia data bank program, the resulting statistical data base will
serve that function indirectly
Privacy Concerns and Jones v Murray
Although the DNA data bank clearly offers some advantages for
improved law enforcement, these benefits must be balanced
against the privacy concerns associated with taking mandatory
blood samples from all felons.
Compulsory Blood Tests
To stock its DNA data bank, Virginia has decided to compel all
felons to give blood samples prior to their release from the peni-
tentiary 222 The earliest traditional fingerprint files also were
stocked only with the prints of felons.223 The Virginia program
raises some interesting Fourth Amendment questions. In Jones v.
Murray,"' six prisoners challenged the data base statute as man-
dating unreasonable searches of their bodies without any individu-
alized suspicion.225 The prisoners argued that "the general purpose
of enforcing the law by improving methods of identification is not
able comparison tool for a DNA fingerprint taken from an African American from New
York. The existence of substructuring, however, makes such a data base entirely
unrepresentative.
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.4 (Michie 1990).
222. Id. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie Supp. 1993) ("Every person convicted of a felony on or after
July 1, 1990 [and every person convicted of certain sex offenses who was incarcerated on
July 1, 1989] shall have a sample of his blood taken for DNA analysis to determine
identification characteristics specific to the person.").
223. Longobardi, supra note 170, at 352 n.184.
224. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
225. Id. at 305.
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sufficient to justify testing an entire class of people merely because
the recidivism rate is higher for them.
2 26
In response, Virginia noted that an individualized suspicion
standard would not permit a meaningful DNA identification bank
to be developed.227 In any event, the State argued, the data bank is
intended to solve future cases, by definition precluding the possi-
bility of a present, individualized suspicion.228 The State also ar-
gued that "the special needs of the government warrant applica-
tion of the balancing test" enunciated in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association, 29 requiring a court to balance the level of
the intrusion with the government interest advanced by the
intrusion.
2 30
The court's rationale for supporting the integrity of the Virginia
data base revolved around the premise that prisoners relinquish
many of their constitutional guarantees.23 1 Thus, the court held
that extracting blood was a search under the Fourth Amendment,
at least with respect to free citizens.232 The court, however, stated
that no cases establish a per se requirement of probable cause, or
even individualized suspicion, when government officials conduct a
limited search to identify a lawfully incarcerated individual.233 The
requisite probable cause, the court reasoned, was present when the
prisoner initially was brought within the confines of the criminal
justice system. "With the person's loss of liberty comes the
loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy "234
The court supported this contention by citing several examples
of privacy invasions that are countenanced in the prison context,
yet remain impermissible when applied against free persons. For
example, prisoners can be subjected to routine searches of their
prison cells and their body cavities.23 5 Thus, when citizens are ar-
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
230. Id. at 307.
231. Id. at 306.
232. Id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559-60 (1979)).
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rested, their identity becomes a matter of legitimate state interest
and they often cannot raise privacy objections.
Perhaps the most cited example is that the State legally is per-
mitted to fingerprint prisoners.2 6 The State fingerprints all ar-
rested persons, not only those whose fingerprints may be relevant
to the crime they committed, to enable the State to identify the
prisoners in its custody 237 "While we do not accept even this small
level of intrusion for free persons without Fourth Amendment con-
straint, the same protections do not hold true for those lawfully
confined to the custody of the state. '238
Assuming that the Fourth Amendment does apply to prisoners,
any search conducted must be reasonable.2 39 The extraction of
blood for DNA analysis involves a greater intrusion than does the
traditional fingerprinting process. The court ruled, however, that
the extraction of blood is a common procedure and the intrusion
involved is not significant.240 With no realistic risk involved in
blood extraction, the court held that "blood testing can be reasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment, even with respect to free per-
sons, where the slight intrusion is outweighed by the governmental
interest advanced by the intrusion. ' ' 24 1 In the case of the DNA data
base, the government interest in improving law enforcement is
strong enough to outweigh the slight intrusion involved in blood
extraction.242
One interesting argument, espoused by the prisoners and
adopted by the dissent, is that DNA is only useful in law enforce-
ment efforts to identify and apprehend violent criminals because
only they are likely to leave a DNA sample.243 Under this argu-
ment, the State has no interest in having DNA fingerprints of non-
violent felons on file. The majority disposed of this argument by
noting that law enforcement officials take traditional fingerprints
of suspects accused of crimes, such as tax evasion, in which finger-
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. (citation omitted).
239. Id. at 307.
240. Id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 308.
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print evidence is of no consequence." The perpetration of non-
violent crimes, the majority reasoned, does not negate the State's
interest in having traditional fingerprint identification information
on file, nor did it negate the State's interest in having the more
advanced DNA fingerprint identification device on file.24 5
Prwate Genetic Information
One argument not espoused by the prisoners in Murray, but ad-
dressed elsewhere, is the concern over the use or disclosure of per-
sonal or medical information from a DNA fingerprint on file with
the Commonwealth.2 46 Existing DNA fingerprints used for identifi-
cation purposes do not contain private medical information.247
Further, the Virginia statute contains precisely drafted guidelines
for the distribution of the information obtained from DNA sam-
ples and contains penalties for the unauthorized use of samples.248
Seemingly aware of the potential for invasion of privacy, Virginia
has provided means for eliminating such problems.
CONCLUSION
DNA fingerprinting truly is a dramatic development in the crim-
inal justice field. While certain problems do exist regarding labora-
tory procedure, analysis of results, and privacy, scientists are ap-
proaching solutions. Virginia has adequately addressed existing
concerns through its enlightened recent court decisions regarding
DNA admissibility and its call for a DNA data bank.
244. Id. at 306.
245. Id., contra id. at 313-14 (Murnaghan, J., concurring m part and dissenting in part)
("I cannot conclude that the government interest in administrative ease suffices to outweigh
a prisoner's expectation of privacy in not having blood withdrawn from his body when that
prisoner is not significantly more likely to commit a violent crime in the future than a mem-
ber of the general population.").
246. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
248. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.6 (Michie 1990)
Any person who, without authority, disseminates information contained in the
data bank shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. Any person who dissemi-
nates, receives, or otherwise uses or attempts to so use information in the data
bank, knowing that such dissemination, receipt, or use is for a purpose other
than as authorized by law, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
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The Virginia DNA data bank program mandates standardized
analysis procedures to eliminate the difficulty of insufficient labo-
ratory performance. In addition, the statistical data base poten-
tially could remedy representation concerns. The Virginia data
bank appears poised to help remedy some early defects and to en-
able DNA fingerprinting technology to reach its full potential in
accurately aiding law enforcement.
James P O'Brien, Jr
